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1. INTRODUCTION
The most important engineered safeguard against the release
of radioactive materials from a nuclear power plant is the
containment system consisting of containment shell(s) being
sufficiently leak-tight under all circumstances including
accidents credible to occur during the plant life~ Because
absolute leaktightness is technically not feasible, certain
leakage will exist in all containment designs.
Evidently, containment systems with multiple barriers will
reduce the leakage of radioactive materials released from
the reactor fuel due to an accident considerably. As it has
been shown earlier(1) the amount of active material released
and the corresponding dose equivalent which persons at the
site around the reactor plant could receive due to a large
accident, can be reduced by a factor of 1000 or more if a
double containment system is being applied. It should be
noted that the effectiveness of a double containment system
depends strongly on the course of accident chosen as a design
basis for the reactor plant and the containment system which
frequently is called the "Design Basis Accident"o In particular
the time function of pressure during the design basis accident
in both the inner and outer containment governs the leakage
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behaviour and subsequent release of active materialso
Therefore the radiation hazard to the environment of a nuclear
power plant is in the first place influenced by the course of
the design basis accident~ by the leakage properties of the
containment system and, of course, by the inventory of radio-
active materials in the reactoro In this paper we will report
on investigations done during the recent months to illuminate
the interrelation between containment system, inventory of
radioactive material and the radiation burden to the environment,
if the activity is accidently releasedo Special emphasis was
paid to the release of various fission products and fuel iso-
topes, particularly iodine and Plutonium, because of their
representing the largest hazard potential to the environment
of a large fast breeder reactoro The calculations were per-
formed for the case of a typical large fast sodium cooled
breeder of 1000 MWe power which is the ultimate goal of the
present phase of fast breeder developmento
In the following, we will (1) discuss the influence of the
release parameters and the release models particularly the
aerosol model on the accident doses for typical single and
double containment systems, (2) we will show the significance
of the decontamination of the containment atmosphere either
by natural plate-out or by artificial means like filter
systems, (3) draw as far as possible conclusions for the
most effective containment systemo Finally we will make some
remarks about the most important parameters and numbers
necessary to develop a reasonable description of the activity
release after large accidents in fast breederso
20 MODE OF CALCULATION
The calculations were carried out by means of the digital
program MUNDO developed at Karlsruhe in the course of theses
investigations which calculates the doses around a nuclear
power plant due to;large accidents as function of the course
of accident, of the activity distribution in the containment
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system following the release from the fuel, and of the
meteorological dispersion in the atmosphere after leakage
through the containment barrierso All the significant effects
influencing the activity release as multiple containment sys-
tems, filter and air cleaning systems, plate-out behaviour,
ground level or stack release can be taken into accounto A
block diagram given in figure 1 shows the lay-out and the
capabilities of this digital program which is published else-
where(2) 0
To reduce the number of parameters being important in this
context the assumptions made in size and type of the power
plant and in the course of accident being the cause of the
activity release were kept constant in all calculationso The
assumptions related to the plant were the following:
Thermal power
Coolant
Load factor
In-pile time
number of fuel batches
Pu 239 (end of cycle)
Pu 240
Pu 241
Pu 242
Reactor building
Height
Radius
Stack height
Free containment volume
primary
secondary
Weather conditions
2500 MW
Sodium
008
600 days
3
2 0 13 to
0 .. 61 to
0007 to
0003 t
cylindrical
35 m
20 m
75 m
8000 m3
16000 m3
Pasquill F*'Ground level release(plane source)
~*~T~'h~i~s---w-e-a-t~h~er condition is defined in(3)0
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Wind velocity
Stack release
(-point source)
Wind velocity
2 m/sec
Pasquill B*
2 m/sec
The assumptions concerning the course of accident were the
following:
Type of accident
Activity release
mechanism
time i'unction
fission gas release
other release fractions
Activity transport
distribution
plate-out
fast nuclear excursion
melting and vaporization of the fuel
instantaneous
100 %
variable
homogeneous
exponential for a limited time
interval
In the calculation of doses we followed the guide lines' of
the ICRP-Recommendations(4). The largest contribution to the
dose values is due to incorporation. Therefore, most results
disc'Ussed in chapter :; are incorporation dose$ only related
to the corresponding organso Although in some cases the acci-
dent dosesdue to release of the noble gases can reach
remarkable values we did not take them into account to
avoid further complication of the results.
30 DOUBLE CONTAINMENT, RADIOACTIVE INVENTORY! RELEASE MODEL
AND PLATE-OUT
3.1 The important isotopes
A number of calculations have been done to show the effec-
tiveness of a double containment system against a single
containment. Although it is easily understood that a double
* This weather condition i6 defined in(3).
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containment reduces the radiation hazard to the public
considerably the amount of reduction depends on various
parameters changing with different reactor typeso In thermal
reactors radioactive Iodine represents the most important
hazard potential because it is easily absorbed in the thy-
roid where it produces the thyroid doseo If we consider fast
sOOlum-coded breeder reactors radioactive Iodine represents
likewise a major hazard potential because the Iodine built-
up is proportional to the power for thermal and fast reac-
torso However, whereas in thermal and fast reactors the
fission product inventory is approximately egual, the inven-
tory of heavy isotopes, particularly Plutonium, in a fast
reactor can be 6-8 times that of a thermal reactor with
comparable powero For instance, the reference reactor con-
sidered (chapter 2) has the following inventory:
I 131 7.9 0 107 Curie MPC = 3 0 10-9 IlC/ cm3
I 132 1101 = 8 0 10-8
I 133 1405 = 1 0 10-8
I 134 1508 = 2 0 10-7
I 135 11 08 = 4 0 10-8
Iodine 701 0 108 Curie
Pu 239 1 031 0 105 Curie MPC = 6 0 10-13
Pu 240 1031 = 6 0 10-13
Pu 241 80000 = 3 0 10-11
Pu 242 0013 = 6 0 10-13
Plutonium 803 0 106 Curie
It can be derived from the maximum permissible concentrations
(NPC) in air given above in the list of important isotopes
that, although the Plutonium activity inventory is two
decades less than the Iodine inventory, the radiological
hazard potential of Plutonium exceeds that of Iodine because
of the higher biological damage effectiveness of the Pluto-
tonium isotopeso This, of course, is true only for reactors
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with high Plutonium inventory as fast breeder reactors are.
In thermal reactors with their small conversion rate much
less Plutonium builds up resulting in a higher radiological
hazard potential of Iodine than of Plutonium as far as the
activity inventory is concerned. Since Iodine is a thyroid
.seeker and Plutonium is a bone seeker the incorporation doses
reported in the following tables pertain to these organs. It
should be noted that the thyroid dose is produced by radioac-
tive Iodine only, whereas in the bone dose the governing
contribution comes from the Plutonium-isotopes with some
smaller contribution of other fission products like Strontium
and Cesium.
3.2 The release models
A number of calculations were carried out with different sets
of release fractions to demonstrate the influence of assump-
tions made on the release of halogens and solids, particularly
Iodine and Plutonium. The results are shown in table 1 in which
accident doses for four different sets of release fractions as
function of the leakage of the containment system are given.
In the first column each line contains a set of release frac-
tions. The first number stands for the halogens, the second
for the solids, and the third for the volatile solids. Noble
gases are not of interest in this context because they do not
contribute to the bone or thyroid dose. Case A represents an
upper limit of pessimistic assumption to our present state of
knowledgeo However it should be mentioned that such a set of
release fractions is being discussed and considered today in
various groups related to the Division of reactor licensing
of the USAECo Case B corresponds to the values of diNunno(5)
taking into account a factor of 5 less for the halogens be-
cause of the good trapping capability of sodium. This set of
release fractions refers for instance to the present stage
of the licensing procedure for the SEFOR reactor, it also
was applied in the safety analysis of the Karlsruhe Na-2
prototype reference design(6)o Case C differs from case B
by assuming release fractions which correspond to the aerosol
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model discussed in chapter 40 Such a set of release fractions
was originally employed in the first SEFOR safety analysis but
was later refused by the USAEC by reason of insufficient
knowledge of the behaviour of aerosolso It should be mentioned
however that the verification of this set of release fractions
is the goal of the Karlsruhe aerosol program initiated in the
recent months to investigate reactor fuel and fission product
aerosolso Finally case D represents the aerosol model together
with optimistic release fractions of gaseous and volatile
fission products which could possibly be accomplished if more
experimental data are availableo
In table 1 the plate-out behaviour, distance from the reactor
plant, and exposure time are kept constanto It should be noted
that the plate-out half time of 1 h for the halogens and vola-
tile solids and of 10 h for the solids are pessimistico There-
fore the values given in table 1 represent upper limits for
the various caseso In particular the doses of case D may be
decreased by a factor of 2 or more if a better plate-out is
assumed and by an additional factor of 5 if the leak rate is
reduced to 001 Volo%/dayo This means that only the accident
doses of case D for the single containment system have the
potential to become low enough to make a single containment
design possible for large fast sodium cooled breedersc
303 Plate-out behaviour
Beside of the leakage characteristics of the containment
system and the release models, plate-out isof similar im-
portance which is illustrated in figure 20 Doses can be
reduced by a few decades, particularly for exposures longer
than 1 day, if a good plate-out behaviour of the important
isotopes and their corresponding chemical compounds can be
assumedo Plate-out in this context stands for both natural
and artificial decontamination processes of the inner
containment atmosphereo Therefore figure 2 shows also the
importance of air cleaning methods like recirculation filter
systems, wash-down systems or similar engineered safeguardso
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From the case 0 (which corresponds to the case 0 of table 1)
it can be derived that depending on the plate-out half time
the thyroid dose or the bone dose is higher than the othero
In figure 3 the plate-out influence for a single containment
is presented showing even more the importance of this effecto
Only in case Ooc, ioeo the aerosol model defined in table 1
(case 0) together with a good plate-out (relatively short
half times) the accident dose s vdll be in the neighbourhood
of 25 remo
This leads to the conclusion that not only the release fractions
but also the plate-out characteristics of the important radio-
active isotopes under the specific accident conditions should
be known and therefore investigatedo
304 Vented double containment
The double containment system considered so far in this paper
consists simply of two leaktight containment shells in serieso
Gaseous and volatile material fromthis containment system is
released at or close to ground level where the atmospheric
dispersion is less effective than at higher altitudeso There-
fore, the release of radioactive material through a stack leads
to a considerable reduction of dases in the reactor vicinityo
We have studied also this type of double containment system
in which the outer containment volume is vented through a
stack, therefore called the "vented double containment 11 0 An
important parameter in the vented double containment is, of
course, the circulation velocity by which the outer contain-
ment volume is ventedo The blowers necessary to exhaust the
air through the stack must be designed to accomplish the
pressure differential between inside and outsideo Therefore,
depending on the in-leakage of the outer containment shell
the air flow pumped through the stack will varyo In table 2
some results for a vented double containment with a 75 meter
high stack are giveno The important conclusion to be drawn
from these numbers is the fact that for the vented double
containment fairly small off-gas-flow rates th-rough the
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stack are necessary (cao 10 Vol%/day) to achieve sufficiently
low dose values, although the containment system can be im-
proved by increasing the stackheight and using offgas filterse
Again theaerosol model (case C) gives sufficiently lowdose
values, if we use the 25 rem bone dose as our yardsticko
40 THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS AS AEROSOLS
From the foregoing considerations and from the results reported
in chapter 3 we have learned the following:
1) The bone dose mainly produced by the release of Plutonium
dominates all other doses in a large accident of a 2500
MWth fast sodium cooled breedero
2) As long as conventional and conservative release models
are applied only very leaktight double containment sys~ems
(5 Volo%/day for the inner, and 005 Vole%/day for the outer
containment) or vented double containments with small stack
release should be used to arrive at reasonably low accident
doseso
3) If release models with low release fractions for the solids
(aerosol models) can be justified, containment requirements
can be relaxed considerablyo Double containments with
higher leakage and even single containment systems may
then become possibleo
The release model which we call the "aerosol model" (case C
and case D in table 1 and 2 and in figure 2 and 3) is based
on the following consideration: If during a large accident
the fuel is melted and vaporized, essentially all the radio-
active inventory contained in the fuel will be released into
the containment atmosphereo The released material will then
cool off rapidlyo Gaseous and volatile material will stay
airborne except that fraction which is plated outo Solid
material, however, can stay airborne only if it is recondensed
to an aerosol like smoke or dusto Certainly this will take
place because recondensation from the gaseous phase is a very
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effective way to produce aerosolso
The question is raised how much of the solid radioactive in-
ventory of the fuel will form aerosolso Although this amount
depends on many parameters of the fuel, of the reactor, and
of the accident conditions a rough estimate can be made
showing the order of magnitude which is implied: The stationary
mass concentration of an aerosol is given by the following
equation:
c =
= particle volume (cm3)
= particle density (g/cm3)
= number of particles per volume (cm-3)
From data on smokes created in ore mines we can estimate a
mass concentration of around 30 milligrams1m3 • Assuming a
containment volume of 10 000 m3 , the amount of solid material
staying airborne would then be 003 kg. This corresponds to
the fraction of 000001 of the 3000 kg of Plutonium inventory
of a 2500 MWth fast sodium cooled breedero Although this
estimate has to be proved and verified theoretically or ex-
perimentally it can be used as a first approximation demonstra-
ting that the detailed process in the release of radioactive
solid material from the fuel should be investigated to provide
a more realistic picture of activity release and radiation
burden to the reactor enviro~~ent.
Another aspect, perhaps more important, should be emphasized.
In the aerosol model we do not ask how much active material
is released from the fuel (release fraction), rather we ask
bow much active material can stay airborne in the containment
atmosphere during the accidento With other words we do not
ask for release fractions which will be subject of doubt as
long as accident models are not sufficiently verifiedo We
rather ask for aerosol behaviour and aerosol parameters which
provide much better access to experimental investigation and
justification. Furthermore, the aerosol model illuminates
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which parameters are of importance in the attempt to reduce
the amount bf activity released in an accidento For instance,
the inner containment volume is direct proportional to the
airborne aerosol mass and therefore proportional to the
activity able to be released through the containment systemo
This means that the inner containment volume should be
minimizedo Effectiveness of filtering and other decontami-
nating systems depend as far as solid material is concerned
on aerosol propertieso Also deposition and inhalation behaviour
of radioactive materials depend on aerosol particle size and
other aerosol parameterso
·We can conclude that the aerosol model is believed to provide
muchmore realistic release data for solid materials and to
describe much better the activity transport after large
accidents in fast sodium cooled breeder reactorso
50 CONCLUSIONS
From the investigations and calculations presented the
following conclusions may be drawn:
1) The presently employed release models for fission products
or fuel material (case B, or in the pessimistic version
case A) make it definitely impossible to employ a single
containment, except one takes the position that the here
considered major accident is assumed to be impossible 0 In
that case however virtually no containment at all is neces-
saryo
2) The extremely conservative assumptions of case A are so
pessimistic that also a double containment does not give
the necessary protectiono The more realistic but still
pessimistic case B gives satisfactory results provided
that the leak rate of the inner containment is not larger
then roughly 10 %0
3) In both cases, A and B, the bone dose is the limiting dose
and therefore Pu instead of Iodine is the limiting factoro
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4) In case of the somewhat optimistic model C which refers
explicitely to the properties of Pu aerosols, the limiting
factor in some cases is Iodine, in others it is the
Plutoniumo The function of a double containment is
satisfactory even with leakage rates of 50 %in case
of the inner containmento
5) Only the fairly optimistic model D making full use of
(assumed) aerosol data not only for Pu but also for other
isotopes gives results, which in case of a good but single
containment come somewhat close to the permitted valueso
In changing from the non-vented double containment to
the vented double containment it should be mentioned that
the,double containment system, which is vented, may not
be applicable at all siteso However, if it is being applied,
that means, if a stack is being provided, the results are
definitely more favorableo
6) In case of a vented double containment already the realistic
but still pessimistic model B gives reasonable dose rates
provided that the rate pf exchanging the air from the outer
containment is not larger than about 100 %/ dayo
The over all conclusion is now, that in view of the forthcoming
era of 1000 MWe fast breeder reactors there is a large and weIl
founded incentive to put great emphasis on the investigation
of aerosol behaviour in the context of fast reactor accidentso
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Table 1 : Accident doses os function of release fractions{ Single and Double Containment>
500 m downwind . exposure time = 24 h
plate - out: TH = 1h halogens and volatile solids
TH = lOh solids
Single Double Containment System
Leakage of Primary Containment 0.5 5 10 50 I 10
..
" Secondary " (00 J 0.5 0.5 0.5 . I 1
(Vol.%/day at 1 at overpressure) (Vol.%/dayl (Vol. %/ day) (Vol. Ofo/dayJ (Vol.OJo/day) I(Vol. %/day J
Release Thyroid Dose (rem) 2650 0.36 1.12 9.8 t 2.230.5
A 0.1 Bone Dose (rem) 73800 147 396 3115 7920.5
0.1 Thyroid Dose (rem) 530 0.072 0.22 1.96 0.44
B 0.01
0.5 Bone Dose (rem) 7420 14.7 39.6 313 79.2
0.1 Thyroid Dose (rem) 530 0.072 0.22 1.96 0.44
C 0.0001 I0.5 Bone Dose (rem) 111 0.15 0.42 3.28 0.83
0.01 Thyroid Dose (rem ) 53 0.0072 0,022 0.197 0.044
D 0.0001
0.1 Bone Dose (rem) 82 0.15 0.40 3.25 0.81
No filter system
Toble 2: Accident Doses for a vented double containment
500 m downwind . exposure time 24 h. stack height 75 m
Case B: plate - out TH = lh halogens and volatile solids
TH = lOh solids
Case C: plate - out TH = 0.5 h halogens and volatile solids
TH = 5 h solids
Leakage of primary Containment 0.5 I 0.5 I
0.5
off - gas flow secondary Containment 1000 I 100 10
(Vol. 0J0 of contained volume I day (Vol. %/day) (Vol. %/day) (VoL.% Iday)
Release (rem) 3.4 0.5 0.05
0.1
Thyroid Dose
B 0.01 Bone Dose (rem) 122 41. 5 5.30.5
0.1 Thyroid Dose (rem) 1.1 0.14 0.014
C 0.0001
0.5 Bone Dose (rem) 0.72 0.19 0.024
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